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Recently, issues of international taxation have also been analysed from a New Economic 
Geography perspective. These discussions show that adding agglomerative forces can 
change the results considerably. In the paper, we introduce explicitly taxation and public 
expenditures into a Footloose Capital Model and investigate the local and global dynamic 
implications of  such a public policy for industry agglomeration. It turns out that 
agglomeration can be highly sensitive wrt initial conditions and/or parameters and that 
these dynamic patterns are surprisingly robust wrt to the taxation principle.  
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1 
1. Introduction 
One of the central concerns in international tax policy is the fear that tax competition leads 
to a loss of industrial capital to competing countries. Recently these issues have also been 
analysed from a New Economic Geography perspective, which stresses agglomerative 
processes and circular causation. Small differences between otherwise identical regions 
may trigger a self-reinforcing process leading to agglomeration of industrial activity in one 
region. In our paper, we pursue the question whether and how differences in taxation and 
public expenditure policy can lead to such a development. 
In the models of the New Economic Geography, regions are separated by transport costs 
and agglomeration is brought about by factor mobility due to differences in regional 
economic incentives. Because of decreasing average costs in production, factor rewards are 
the higher, the higher the local demand is. A high share in total expenditure thus leads to an 
even higher share in industrial capital. This indicates obvious points at which public policy, 
i.e. taxation and public expenditures can affect this mechanism. Transport costs can be 
reduced by public expenditures for infrastructure (see Martin and Rogers, 1995). Factor 
                                                 
1 The paper benefits from previous joint work with Martin Currie and from valuable discussions with him. 
While working on this paper, Ingrid Kubin enjoyed the kind hospitality of the CENDEF at the University of 
Amsterdam. Contributions from Florian Wagener; Pietro Dindo and other participants in a CENDEF 
workshop are gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveat applies.     3 
mobility motivated by differences in net factor income is directly affected by tax policy. 
Most studies of public policy within the New Economic Geography take this aspect on 
board (e.g. the literature on tax competition: Baldwin and Krugman, 2004, and Borck and 
Pflüger, 2006 among the others). The provision of public goods can also impact upon the 
migration decision (see for this aspect Baldwin et al., 2003). However, public policy is also 
a central factor determining both the level and the composition of local demand. In a 
framework with decreasing average cost this directly influences gross factor rewards.
2 
Income taxes change the disposable income and thus private expenditures; public 
expenditures are typically different from the private ones as far as their regional and 
sectoral structure is concerned. Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004) study the former aspect, 
while the latter is at the core of our analysis. Thus, we ask whether sectoral differences in 
public policy may lead to industry agglomeration. 
In studying this question, we focus on taxation of capital income – since capital is the factor 
that is by far more mobile than labour
3 – and differentiate between two forms of taxation: 
Under the residence principle, public policy has no direct effect upon mobility incentives, 
which allows us to study the effects via differences in the sectoral structure of demand in 
insulation. Under the source principle, taxation affects mobility incentives as well. For our 
purpose, we therefore need a model in which the capital owners’ country of residence may 
be different from the country in which the capital income originates. This leads us to 
adopting a special variant of the Footloose Capital Model. That is, we extend this model by 
explicitly incorporating private and public demand and we allow for the possibility that 
public expenditure has a different sectoral structure from the private one. 
                                                 
2 The provision of public goods can also affect factor rewards in a region via its effect upon productivity. This 
aspect is important but to our knowledge not yet studied in the New Economic Geography models. 
3 For simplification, we assume that labour income is not taxed at all.     4 
The focus of the following study is on the analysis of the dynamic processes involved.
4 
Typically, New Economic Geography models are formulated in continuous time; in past 
works, we have shown that reformulating them in discrete time may change the results 
considerably. In Currie and Kubin (2006) we analysed Krugman's the quintessential Core 
Periphery model and in Commendatore et al. ( 2006) we explored the dynamics of a 
symmetric Footloose Capital model. Our present paper extends this study to an asymmetric 
case, naturally brought about by differences in public policy. With taxation according to the 
residence principle, differences in regional public policy translate into different regional 
shares in total expenditures, which are independent of capital allocation; with taxation 
according to the source principle, the regional shares depend – in addition to the public 
policy parameters – also upon the capital allocation. This fact considerably complicates the 
analytic structure. Nevertheless, it turns out that the basic implication of our analysis carries 
over: Differences in regional tax policy make agglomeration more likely; however, it may 
depend quite sensitively upon initial conditions and parameters which of the regions under 
consideration ends up with the core of industrial production. 
 
2. Assumptions 
The Footloose Capital (FC) model involves two countries or regions, each with a 
monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector and a perfectly competitive agricultural 
sector. There are two factors of production. Labour is used in both sectors. Capital is used 
only in manufacturing. Workers are immobile between regions but instantaneously mobile 
between sectors within a region. A key feature of the FC model is that physical capital is 
                                                 
4 Policy issues and welfare implications are elaborated in a twin paper, Kubin (2006).     5 
mobile between regions but capital owners are completely immobile and they spend all 
their earnings in the region in which they live. 
Consumers in both regions have the following utility function, which is linearly separable 
in private and public consumption: 
(1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) G M A C U C C U
~ 1 + =
- m m . 
A C  is the quantity consumed of a homogeneous agricultural good;  M C  denotes a quantity 
index that is a CES function of the varieties of manufactured goods. The constant elasticity 
of substitution between the manufactured varieties is denoted by 1 s > ; the lower s, the 
greater the consumers’ taste for variety. The exponents of the agricultural good and of the 
manufacturing composite in the common utility function –  ( ) 1 m -  and m, respectively – 
indicate the invariant shares of disposable income devoted to the agricultural good and to 
manufactures; therefore  01 m ££ .  ( ) G C U
~
 denotes the utility derived from the supply of a 
public commodity  G C . 
In providing the public good, the government uses the agricultural commodity and/or 
manufactured commodities according to the following production function: 
(2)  ( ) ( )
1 nn -
= GAM CCC . 
This specification implies that the  share of governmental revenue devoted to the 
agricultural commodity and to the manufacturing composite –  ( ) 1 n -  and n , respectively, 
with  01 n ££  – may differ from the private shares; the elasticity of substitution between 
the manufactured varieties, however, is assumed to be the same for the private and the     6 
public sector. Public expenditures are financed by capital income taxes, the budget is 
always balanced. 
There are L workers, who are immobile between regions and equally distributed between 
the regions.
5 Each worker provides one unit of labour per period. With labour being the 
sole agricultural input, one unit of labour yields one unit of the agricultural product. 
Transportation of the agricultural product between regions is costless. In addition, the 
economies are endowed with  K  units of physical capital. Since we are not focusing on 
distributional issues or on changes in factor endowments, we assume that each worker owns 
one unit of capital, i.e. we assume  KL = . Capital is mobile between the regions at the 
transitions between time periods in response to economic incentives. 
Manufacturing involves increasing returns: each manufacturer requires a fixed input of 1 
unit of capital to operate and has a constant marginal labour requirement  b . Transport 
costs for manufactures take an iceberg form: if 1 unit is shipped between the regions, 1 T  
arrives where  1 ‡ T . ‘Trade freeness’ is defined as 
1 s f
- ”T  where  01 f <£ , with  1 f =  
representing no trade cost and with trade cost becoming prohibitive as  0 f ﬁ .  The 
manufacturing sectors involve Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. Given the 
consumers’ preference for variety, a firm would always produce a variety different from the 
varieties produced by other firms. Thus the number of varieties is always the same as the 
number of firms. Furthermore, since 1 unit of capital is required for each manufacturing 
firm, the total number of firms / varieties, n, is always equal to the total supply of capital: 
                                                 
5 We assume that neither region has enough labour to satisfy the total demand of both regions for the 
agricultural good. Thus, both regions always produce the agricultural commodity – the so-called non-full-
specialization condition.     7 
(3)  nK =  
The number of varieties produced in period t in region r, where 1,2 = r , is:  
(4)  ( ) ( ) 1,2, 11 tttttt nnKnnK llll ===-=-  
where 01 l ££ t  denotes the share of physical capital used in region 1 in period t.  
As with most economic geography models, the primary focus of the FC model is the spatial 
location of manufacturing industry, governed here by the endogenous regional allocation of 
capital, lt . 
In what follows, we complete the model by characterizing the short-run general equilibrium 
in period t contingent on  lt , by specifying explicitly the capital migration process, and by 
analysing the long-run equilibrium given as fixed point of the capital mobility dynamics. 
We consider two different cases depending on the principle of capital taxation: In Section 3 
we assume that taxes are collected according to the residence principle. In Section 4, we 
analyse the case of taxation according to the source principle, which turns out to be 
analytically more complex. 
3. Full Model with Taxation according to the Residence Principle 
3.1. Short-run General Equilibrium 
With the instantaneous establishment of equilibrium in the agricultural market and no 
transport costs, the agricultural price is the same in both regions. Since competition results 
in zero agricultural profits, the equilibrium nominal wage of workers in period t is equal to 
the agricultural product price and is therefore always the same in both regions. We take this 
wage / agricultural price as the numeraire. Since manufacturers in both regions face that     8 
same wage in every period, all set the same mill price p, using the Dixit-Stiglitz pricing 








The effective price paid by consumers for one unit of a variety produced in the other region 
is  pT . 
Short-run general equilibrium in period t requires that each manufacturer meets the demand 
for its variety.
6 For a variety produced in region r: 
(6)  ,, = rtrt qd  
where  , rt q  is the output of each manufacturer in region r and  , rt d  is the demand for that 












This profit per variety constitutes the regional rental per unit of capital.  
Consumers and governments (as input demanders) face regional manufacturing price 
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6 As a result of Walras’ Law, equilibrium in all product markets implies equilibrium in the regional labour 
markets.     9 



















, rt M  denotes private and public expenditures for manufactured goods in region  r;  t M  




















































































For future reference, note that regional and world profit incomes,  , P rt and  t P  respectively, 
are given by 











=+ tt YLM .     10 
Crucial for the subsequent dynamic analysis is the relative profitability of capital  ( ) lt R  
given by: 
(14)  ( )
( ) ( ) ( )

















We now turn to the specificities of taxation according to the residence principle, under 
which the tax rate prevailing in the region, in which the capital owner resides, is applied to 
any income she receives irrespective of the location in which the income originates. It 
follows that the tax burden on capital owners living in region  r is identical to the tax 
revenues for government r, denoted by , rt TR : 




rtr TR t  
01 r t ££  denotes the regional tax rate on profit incomes. If it is different between the 
regions, tax revenues and tax burdens differ as well. Regional expenditures for 
manufactured goods are therefore given as  
(16)  ,,, 22





MTRTR mn  
Public policy affects expenditures for manufactured goods in as far private and public 
expenditure shares differ; i.e. mn „ . Those effects differ between regions, if local tax rates 
are different; i.e.  12 tt „ . 
Observing (12) and (15), world expenditures for manufactures are  
(17)  ( ) ( )( ) ( )
12
1,2, 2
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EtE ss . 
With the residence principle, world income (see equation  (13)), total expenditures for 
manufactures and its regional split are constant, i.e. independent of the regional allocation 
of capital.  E s , the expenditure share for manufactured goods in Region 1, will be one of 
our central parameters. It summarizes the effects of public expenditure and tax policy. If 
both regions have the same tax rate, i.e. if  12 tt = , or if public expenditure behaviour is not 
different from the private one, i.e. if  mn = , then 
1
2
= E s  as in the symmetric Footloose 
Capital Model without a public sector. If regional tax policy differs, i.e.  12 tt „ , and if this 
difference matters for expenditure behaviour, i.e. if  mn „ , then  0.5 E s „ . Equ. (19) shows 
that the high tax region ends up with the higher expenditure share for manufactured goods, 
if governments spend more for manufactured goods than private consumer do; i.e. if nm > . 








     12 
where  E s D  can be interpreted as measuring the degree of asymmetry brought about by the 
combined effect of public tax and expenditure policy. Given the constraints on the 






 holds.  
Finally, expressions (11), (18) and (19) determine short-run equilibrium regional profits per 
variety. The relative profitability of capital  ( ) lt R  is given by: 
(21) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )




























For  0 E s D=  the analysis is equivalent to that of the symmetric Footloose Capital Model 
without a public sector. 
3.2. Capital Movements and the Complete Dynamical Model 
In a Footloose Capital model, the representative capitalist does not move herself, but 
allocates the physical capital she owns between the regions. In doing so, she is interested in 
her utility or in her real net income.
7 Since all income is taxed and spent in the home region 
of the capitalist, the relevant tax rate and price index for calculating real net income are the 
ones at home, irrespective of the regional capital allocation. Therefore, in this case 
orientation at real net income is equivalent to an orientation at nominal gross income. 
                                                 
7 Assuming that the representative capitalist takes the level of the public good provided at home as given, the 
indirect utility function, which follows from the specification in equation (1), is linear in real income.      13 
In specifying the dynamic process we recur to ideas from the replicator dynamics widely 
used in evolutionary economics and evolutionary game theory (see e.g., Weibull, 1997). 
Taking into account the constraint  1 01 l + ££ t , the piecewise smooth one-dimensional map 
whereby  1 l + t  is determined by  lt  is: 
(22)  ( )
( )





















where lt  is in [0,1] implies that  1 l + t  is in [0,1] and where 
(23)  ( ) ( ) ( )

















with  0 g > . We refer to g  as the ‘speed’ with which the representative capitalist alters his 
regional allocation of capital in response to the ratio in regional profitability,  ( ) lt R .
8 The 
map  ( ) t F l  can also be written as: 
                                                 
8 In the literature on the replicator dynamics, it is common to assume that the change in the share of agents 
adopting one strategy depends on the “fitness” of the strategy under consideration in comparison to the 
average “fitness” of all available strategies. In our context the strategies correspond to “using the capital in 
region 1 or using it in region 2”; and it is straightforward to interpret the resp. profit rates as indicating the 
“fitness” of those two strategies. Leaving for the moment boundary conditions out of the consideration, this 



























. In addition, we allow for an adjustment 

















, which can be 
transformed into equation (23). Note that this specification is a good approximation to the discrete-time 
counterpart of the process assumed by Puga (1998) in his core-periphery model, namely to     14 
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which nicely reveals the following symmetry property with respect to  0.5 E s =  and 
0.5 t l = : If for  E s ,  lt  is mapped onto  1 l + t , then for  ( ) 1 E s - ,  ( ) 1 l - t  is mapped onto 
( ) 1 1 l + - t . Recalling the definition of  E s  (see equ. (19)) this means that swapping private 
and public expenditure shares or swapping regional tax rates engenders swapping of 
regional shares in capital allocation. The same holds also for iterates of higher order. 
Fixed points for the dynamical system, which correspond to long-run equilibria, are defined 
by  ( ) = Z ll . Core-periphery equilibria, i.e.  0 0 =
CP l  or  1 1 =
CP l , are boundary fixed points 
of the dynamic system. A central question of the New Economic Geography concerns 
critical values for trade freeness (or for any other parameter) at which agglomeration in 
either region is sustainable. The so-called sustain points give conditions under which “the 
advantages created by such a concentration, should it somehow come into existence, [are] 
sufficient to maintain it” (Fujita et al., 1999). Sustain points therefore specify conditions at 
which the boundary equilibria 
CP
i l  (where i = 0, 1) become (at least locally) stable. These 
critical values are defined by  ( ) '1
CP
i F l = , with the latter indicating the derivative of the 
first return map (23). It can be reduced to  ( ) 1
CP
i R l =  and solved for  
                                                                                                                                                     
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1ln
ttttt FKR llllVl =+-  with  K Vg = . In particular, the fixed points and the derivatives at 










                    








() Si f  indicates the sustain point for 
CP
i l . For  0.5 E s D=  it holds that 
(0)(1) 1
SS ff == ; 
for  0.5 E s D>  this condition changes to 
(1)(0)
1
SS ff <<  (and for  0.5 E s D<  it holds that 
(0)(1)
1 <<
SS ff ). 










A second central question of the New Economic Geography concerns critical values for the 
trade freeness (or for any other parameter) at which an (interior) equilibrium without spatial 
concentration “breaks up”. This so-called break point gives conditions under which “small 
differences among locations [will] snowball into larger differences over time, so that the 
symmetry between identical locations will spontaneously break” (Fujita et al., 1999). I.e. it 
gives conditions under which an interior fixed point  * l  becomes (at least locally) unstable 
and the dynamics is attracted to one of the boundary equilibria. Analytically, the break 
point is defined by  ( ) *1 F l ¢ = . In our model, the break point arises when the interior fixed 
point coincides with one of the boundary fixed points and it is equal to the corresponding 
sustain point. At that value of the trade freeness a transcritical bifurcation occurs (see 
Wiggins, 1990). Two curves of fixed points (concerning the interior fixed point and one of 
the boundary fixed points) cross each other (with the interior fixed point leaving the 
admissible interval) and they exchange stability.  
In our model, interior fixed points can also lose (local) stability because the derivative of 
the map in equ. (22) evaluated at the fixed point crosses the critical value of – 1. If by     16 
varying one parameter (or more parameters simultaneously) the inequality  ( ) *1 ¢ <- F l  
holds, an attracting period two-cycle emerges through a Flip bifurcation. The condition 
( ) *1 F l ¢ =-  allows to determine critical parameters values.  
Considering a change in trade freeness, which is the central parameter for the New 
Economic Geography, a Flip bifurcation occurs if 
(27) 
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. 
For  2 g > , this equation implicitly defines a unique bifurcation value  01
Flip f << .
9 Note 
the term  ( ) 1 EE ss - : f
Flip
 does not change if  E s  is replaced by( ) 1 E s - , or – using equ. (19) 
– if n  and  m  or  1 t  and  2 t are swapped. Note as well that f
Flip
 is declining in ( )
2
D E s . 
Figure 1 summarizes the (local) properties of the fixed points as depending upon the trade 
freeness  f . Figure 1a corresponds t o the so-called tomahawk diagram representing the 
fixed points; Figure 1b is a bifurcation diagram and Figure 1c reports the corresponding 
Lyapunov coefficients. Since we have chosen  0 E s D> , the boundary equilibrium  0 0
CP l =  
is (locally) unstable for all values of  f . In a highly open economy (i.e. low transport costs 
or high trade freeness), in particular for  ( ) 1 1
S B fff >>=  no interior fixed point exists 
                                                 























 holds for  2 g ‡  and  01
E s ££  (which implies 
that  ( ) 010.25
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* l  
0 =
CP l  
1 =
CP l      17 
within the (0,1) interval, and the boundary equilibrium  1 1
CP l =  is (locally) stable. As  f  
crosses the sustain point  ( ) 1 S f , a transcritical bifurcation occurs:  1 1
CP l =  loses its stability; 
the interior fixed point enters the (0,1) interval and becomes locally stable. As  f  crosses 
f
Flip
, the interior fixed point loses stability via a Flip bifurcation. Attracting periodic 
solutions appear, first a period two cycle, then  – at lower values of  f  – the time path 
exhibits more complex and even chaotic patterns with an ever increasing volatility of the 
regional share in capital. Once f
A
 is reached, the share of capital assumes the value of one 
(or zero), i.e. one of the boundaries is hit and agglomeration via volatility occurs. Given the 
mobility hypothesis as specified in (22) and (23), the share of capital does no longer change 
once a boundary value is assumed. The core-periphery fixed points, though locally 
unstable, act as a so-called "snap-back repeller". In that situation, it might become highly 
sensitive to initial conditions which region ultimately ends up with the core.  
The fact that locally unstable fixed points are globally attracting shows that it might be 
worthwhile to study the global properties of the dynamic process as well. However, before 
doing this, we explicitly address the question what are the impacts of public policy on the 
(local) dynamics. 
A Flip bifurcation occurs if the expenditure and public policy parameters n , m ,  1 t  and  2 t , 
satisfy the following condition (using equ. (19) and (27)): 













For  E s D , or for each of the parameters n ,  m ,  1 t  and  2 t , there exist two Flip bifurcation 
values that are symmetric with respect to  0 E s D= , i.e. wrt nm =  and  12 tt = , respectively.     18 
This symmetry in connection with the symmetry of the map  ( ) lt Z  as defined above carries 
over to the bifurcation diagrams as shown in Figure 2 for  1.5 s = , which implies 
max 0.167 E s D= , and three different values of the trade freeness: a)  0.35 = f , b)  0.315 = f  
and c)  0.29 = f . 
Let us now take a closer look at the comparative dynamics’ impact of public policy as 
depending upon the trade freeness. Without public policy  0 E s D= ; public policy introduces 
an asymmetry with 
max 0 EE ss <D£D  (see equ. (19)). Recalling that – as noted above – 
Flip f  is declining in D E s  it holds that: 
(29)  ( ) ( ) ( )
max 00
FlipFlipFlip
EEE sss fff D=>D>>D . 
This has the following implications:  
First, for  ( ) 0 ff >D=
Flip
E s  the fixed point is stable without and with any public policy –
no public policy can destabilizes the fixed point.  
Second,  ( ) ( )
max 0
FlipFlip
EE ss fff D=>>D  the fixed point without public policy is unstable 
– in Figure 2 the dynamics exhibits a period two cycle – but it is stable for the extreme 
values of public policy: Strong public policy exerts a stabilizing influence. Intermediate 
values of public policy, however, can add to the complexity of the dynamics (see Figure 2a 
and 2b).  
Third, for  ( ) ( )
max 0
FlipFlip
EE ss fff D=>D>  the fixed point is unstable for all values of the 
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    Figure 2  
 
0.35 f =  
0.315 f =  
0.29 f =      19 
intermediate values of public policy can even lead to full agglomeration in one region (see 
Figure 2c). 
Figure 3, which is drawn for an adjustment speed of  10 = g  and for  25 . 0 0
max = D £ D £ E E s s , 
summarizes the properties of the global dynamics; Figure 3a delimitates parameter regions 
with different long run behaviour, Figures 3b to 3d illustrate these different types of 
behaviour as depending upon the initial condition  1 0 0 £ £l . A black (white) tile indicates 
that the long run behaviour settles on  1 1
CP l =  ( ) 0 0
CP l = ; a grey tile indicates that the long 
run dynamics stays within the boundaries, i.e. that it settles either on an interior fixed point 
or on an interior cyclical/complex attractor. 
Since  E s D £ 0  the boundary equilibrium  0 0
CP l =  is locally unstable for all parameter 
values. In Region N the trade freeness is beyond the sustain point, i.e.  ( ) 1 S f f ‡ : No interior 
fixed point exists and the boundary fixed point  1 1
CP l =  is locally and globally stable. For 
the other parameter combinations, both boundary equilibria are locally unstable and an 
interior fixed point exists, which is locally stable as long as 
Flip f f ‡  holds. It is especially 
interesting to analyse under what conditions the global dynamics is attracted to one of the 
(locally unstable) boundary fixed points. Decisive for that is whether or not the boundary 
conditions impinge upon the dynamics, i.e. whether or not  ( ) 01 t F l ££ . Figure 3a shows 
three regions, the boundaries of which can be determined analytically, and Figure 4 depicts 
corresponding examples of  ( ) t F l . 
In region A (see Figure 4a), no boundary condition is involved –  ( ) ( ) 1 t MaxFl <+  and 
( ) ( ) 0 t MinFl > . Therefore, the two boundary fixed points, which are locally unstable, are 
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point, which is stable in region A1, or the periodic orbit in Region A2 born after the Flip 
bifurcation, are globally stable – almost all initial conditions will be attracted to them (in 
Region A2 periodic unstable fixed points might exist; those and their pre-images will not 
converge to the stable attractor). 
In Region B only the upper boundary is binding, i.e.  ( ) ( ) 1 t MaxFl >+  and 
( ) ( ) 0 t MinFl > . Figures 4b to 4d are some examples of the corresponding first return 
map. In this region the – locally unstable – boundary fixed point  1 1
CP l =  has a basin of 
attraction: Initial conditions  0 l , for which  ( ) 0 1 F l >  – i.e. initial conditions on the bold 
segment in Figures 4b to 4d – and all pre-images of that range will be attracted to it. In 
Region B1 and B2 some initial conditions will be attracted to a trapping set, which is 
constructed by using  ( ) ( ) t MinFl  and its iterates (see Figures 4b and 4c). Therefore, in 
Region B1 (B2) both the boundary fixed point  1 1
CP l =  and the interior fixed point (the 
cyclical fixed point born after the Flip Bifurcation) have a basin of attraction. In region B3, 
the trapping set vanishes and all initial conditions are attracted to the boundary fixed point 
1 1
CP l =  (see Figure 4d). Of particular interest is the boundary between Region B2 and B3: 
The first return map in the trapping set (see Figure 4c) is very similar to the one of the 
logistic equation (in the limiting case). In analogy, the Li-Yorke theorem can be applied 
and it can be shown that cycles of any length exist (see Aligood et al., 1996). Therefore, the 
dynamics is chaotic on that boundary.  
In region B4 (see Figure 4e) no trapping set exists: the basin of attraction for the boundary 
fixed point  1 1
CP l =  and for the interior cyclical fixed point can be complex (this is clearly 
shown in the enlargement in Figure 3d, which shows in grey the complex basin of attraction     21 
for an interior solution). In that region, it is highly sensitive to initial conditions whether 
both regions coexist or whether agglomeration occurs in Region 1. 
In region C, both boundary conditions are binding, i.e.  ( ) ( ) 1 t MaxFl >+  and 
( ) ( ) 0 t MinFl <  (see Figure 4e). Now almost all initial conditions will converge to one of 
the boundary fixed points: Initial conditions  0 l , for which  ( ) 0 1 F l >  and all pre-images of 
that range will be attracted to  1 1
CP l = ; initial conditions  0 l , for which  ( ) 0 0 F l <  and all 
pre-images of that range will be attracted to  0 0
CP l = . The only exceptions are again initial 
conditions on unstable cycle fixed points and its pre-images. In this Region, the boundaries 
of the basins of attractions are complex.  
Figure 3 also allows to assess the impact of an asymmetry brought about by public tax and 
expenditure policy upon the global dynamics: In the symmetric case (i.e. for  0 E s D= ) only 
Region A1, A2 and C are possible. Therefore, either the interior fixed point and the interior 
cyclical solutions are globally stable (Regions A1 and A2 resp.); or both boundary fixed 
points have a complex basin of attraction (Region C). In the asymmetric case we analysed 
(i.e. for  0 E s D> ),
10 the region N and different regions B occur; i.e. regions in which initial 
conditions exist that are attracted to the boundary fixed point  1 1
CP l = . I n that sense, 
asymmetry reduces the basin of attraction of the interior solutions (in which both regions 
coexist) and of the boundary fixed point  0 0
CP l =  but increases the basin of attraction of the 
boundary fixed point  1 1
CP l = .  
 
                                                 
10 For  0
E s D< , the boundary equilibria would exchange their stability properties symmetrically.      22 
4. Taxation according to the source principle 
4.1. Short-run General Equilibrium 
With taxation according to the source principle capital income is taxed according to the tax 
rate that prevails in the region, in which the income originates, irrespective of the location, 
in which the capital owner lives. Also in this case equations (1) to (14) apply. However, 
regional tax revenues are now given as 
(30)  ( ) 1,11,2,22, 1 tlptlp ==- tttttt TRKTRK  
























Tax burdens are identical between regions; changes in the tax rates affect private spending 
in both regions in an identical way. However, regional tax burdens are no longer identical 
to regional tax revenues. Therefore, if regional tax revenues are different and at least some 
of these revenues is spent for manufactured goods, i.e.  0 n > ,
11 regional expenditures are 
also different. Taxation according to the source principle relocates expenditures for 
manufacturers to the region with the higher tax revenue. Regional tax revenues do not only 
depend upon the tax rates, but also on the allocation of capital between the regions  lt , 
which determines the tax base.  
                                                 
11 Note that the crucial point is whether the share in public expenditure devoted to manufactured goods is 
positive and not whether it is greater than the private share.     23 
World expenditures for manufactured goods are given as  
(32) 
( ) ( )( )












Note that they are no longer constant but depend upon the allocation of capital. The 
regional split of expenditures for manufacturers is: 
(33)  ( ) ( )

































Also here it is clearly visible that the region with the higher tax revenue gets the higher 
share in expenditures (if at least some of the tax revenue is spent for manufactured goods). 
Given the regional allocation of capital  lt , equations (11), (32) and (33) allow to determine  
(34)  ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )











































( ) lt C  is a complicated expression which collects all terms depending upon tax policy and 
upon the regional allocation of capital. Note that the region 1's share of expenditure is no     24 
longer constant, but depends upon the capital allocation, i.e.  ( ) , = EtEt ss l . Finally, 
expressions (11) and (34) determine short-run equilibrium regional profit rates and their 
ratio: 
(36)  ( )
( )( ) ( )( )





















For  0 n =  or for  12 0 tt ==  the analysis is equivalent to that of the symmetric Footloose 
Capital model without a public sector. Note as well the similarity in structure with the 
corresponding expression for the residence principle in equation (21). 
4.2. Capital Movement and the Complete Dynamical Model 
In contrast to the previous case, with taxation according to the source principle, it is the 
ratio of net nominal profits that is the relevant economic incentive for capital reallocation:  
(37)  ( )















The central dynamic equation now is 
(38)  ( )
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  with 
(39)  ( ) ( )
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.     25 
This map is analytically more complex than the one presented above related to the 
residence principle case. Nevertheless, there are some common features: It also exhibits a 
symmetry property, which slightly different from the above one. Swapping the regional tax 












-=  (see equation ((36)), it holds that 
( ) ( ) 2112 1,,1,, tt FF lttltt -=- . It also has two critical points, which change 
systematically with a change in the parameters, in a similar way as for the map above (see 
the examples in Figure 6). The impact of the boundary conditions is similar as well. 
Therefore, although less analytic results are obtainable much of the previous analysis 
carries over to this case. 
Again, two boundary fixed point capital allocations –  0 0
CP l =  and  1 1
CP l =  – exist and 
change (local) stability at the sustain points.
12 The latter are defined by  ( ) '1
CP
i F l = , which 
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S f .  
For  0 0
CP l =  the sustain points are given by 
                                                 
12 In the following, we assume 













































t R , which solves for 
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l =  corresponds to that in the symmetric Footloose 
Capital model without a public sector. At break points, the interior fixed point changes 
stability. Analytically, the break point 
B f  is defined by  ( ) *1 ¢ = F l  or, equivalently by 
( ) *0 ¢ = R l . In our model, the break point and the sustain point for  1 1
CP l =  coincide, 
(1) =
BS ff. As above, at 
B f  a so-called transcritical bifurcation occurs. Two curves of fixed 
points (concerning the interior fixed point and the boundary fixed point 1 1
CP l = ) cross each 
other (with the interior fixed point leaving the admissible interval) and they exchange 
stability. Note that – in contrast to the previous analysis – transcritical bifurcations also 
occur at 
(0) S
i ff = . However, in this case the interior fixed point is (locally) unstable for 
(0)(0)
12 <<
SS fff . At 
(1) FlipBS fff <=  the interior fixed point looses stability  via a Flip 
bifurcation. However, in contrast to the simpler case analysed above, no simple analytic 
expression is available for the bifurcation value.     27 
Figure 5a shows the fixed points as depending upon the trade freeness and the bifurcation 
diagram in Figure 5b illustrates their (local) dynamic p roperties; Figure 5c shows the 
corresponding Lyapunov coefficients. 
In our numeric example 
(1)(0)(0)
12
FlipBSSS fffff <=<<, which delimits various ranges for 




S ff <  and for 
(1)(0)
1 <<
SS fff , no interior fixed point exists within the interval (0,1). 
The boundary fixed point  0 0
CP l =  is (locally) unstable, and  1 1




SS fff , both boundary fixed point are (locally) stable. In addition, a (locally) 
unstable interior fixed point exists, which delimits the basin of attraction for the two 
boundary fixed points. This property is illustrated in the bifurcation diagram for which an 
initial value  0 0.1 l =  has been chosen.  
For  <<
FlipB fff , a (locally) stable interior fixed point exists. Both boundary fixed points 
are (locally) unstable. 
For  <
Flip ff , the interior fixed point has lost stability via a Flip bifurcation and an 
attracting cyclical solution  exists. Both boundary fixed points continue to be (locally) 
unstable. Note the complex dynamics for low values of  f  and again the phenomenon, 
which we call agglomeration through volatility, that occurs for  <
A ff .  
Also the impact of differences in regional public policies on the (local) dynamic behaviour 
is similar to the above analysis of the residence principle (see Figure 2). In numerical 
experiments it turns out that, also for the source principle case, it depends upon the degree  
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S f      28 
of trade freeness: For high values of trade freeness, strong differences in public policy can 
be stabilizing; for lower values public policy can act as an additional source of fluctuations. 
Finally, Figure 6, which is the equivalent of Figures 3 and 4, illustrates the properties of the 
global dynamics. Due to the higher degree of analytic complexity, the boundaries in region 
A, B and C can only be determined numerically. However, the basic pattern carries over: 
As Figure 6a shows, t he behaviour in the various regions is the same irrespective of 
whether taxation follows the residence or the source principle. The only difference is that 
region N is now split into two sub-regions delimitated by the sustain points: In Region N0 
both boundary fixed points have a basin of attraction; in Region N1, all initial conditions 
are attracted to  1 1
CP l = . For further illustration, Figures 6b to 6d are examples of maps 
corresponding to  specific parameter values: in particular, travelling  in Figure 6a 
horizontally along  2 0.55 = t  from right to left, we have chosen four different values for the 
trade freeness: (i)  0.25 = f ; (ii)  0.228 = f ; (iii)  0.217 = f ; and (iv)  0.5 = f . 
 
5. Conclusions 
With the reduction of barriers to commodity trade and factor mobility q uestions of 
international tax policy have become increasingly debated: Countries fear to lose industrial 
capital to competing neighbours. We studied this question in a New Economic Geography 
framework, in particular in a Footloose Capital model, which we extended to allow for a 
public sector. Capital income is taxed according to the residence or according to the source 
principle and tax revenue are spend for providing a public commodity. In doing so, public 
policy changes the sectoral split of total (public plus private) expenditures, which is the key 
magnitude for determining regional factor reward and thus factor mobility. We explicitly (a)  2 t  
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modeled this process – along the lines of a replicator dynamics –  in discrete time and 
studied under what conditions agglomeration is possible. In addition to its local properties, 
we paid special attention to the global features. Three fixed points can be differentiated: 
two boundary fixed points (industrial capital is agglomerated in region 1 or in region 2) and 
one interior fixed point, which is asymmetric, since we allow for differences in regional tax 
rates (otherwise the parameters are identical between the regions). We focused our analysis 
on parameter combinations for which the interior fixed point – as long as it exists – exhibits 
a larger share of industrial capital in region 1 than in region 2, i.e. we focus on a public 
policy which favours region 1. The local analysis reveals that the interior fixed point loses 
stability via a Flip bifurcation after which periodic and chaotic attractors emerge, and that 
both boundary fixed points are (locally) unstable for some (or the entire) parameter range. 
However, the global analysis shows that – although being locally unstable – for each of the 
boundary fixed points a basin of attraction exists (the boundaries of which may be highly 
complex).  Although public policy favours region 1 in the above mentioned sense, 
agglomeration in either region is a possible outcome. It may be highly sensitive to initial 
conditions and/or parameters, which region ends with the agglomeration of industrial 
capital. Comparing the results to the one obtained for the symmetric case without public 
policy,  we noticed that: (i) the basin of attraction for agglomeration in R egion 2 – the 
region which has at the interior fixed point the lower share of industrial capital – shrinks; 
(ii) the one of the interior fixed point with industry coexisting in both regions  also 
contracts; and (iii) the one of agglomeration in Region 1 increases. Public policy, which 
favours R egion 1 at the fixed point, favours it also from a dynamic perspective. 
Surprisingly enough, it turns out that those dynamic properties are quite robust and do not 
change when taxation according to the residence principle is replaced by one according to 
the source principle.     30 
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